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Abstract  
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus (COVID-19) 
outbreak a pandemic. As the evolution and implications of the COVID-19 crisis are still unfolding, we 
posit that exploring the experiences and strategic responses of Asian countries may shed some useful 
light on ways to combat COVID-19 for the rest of the world. In this paper, we first articulate the 
importance of resilience, strategic agility, and entrepreneurship in the context of the fight against 
COVID-19. Then, with a focus on China, South Korea, and Singapore, we discuss the impact COVID-
19 is having on economies and businesses, governmental support for businesses and societies, and 
implications for global supply chain disruptions. We hope that the global health system will recover 
quickly, and that the world economy will be revitalized with the contributions and collaboration of 
science (including social science), industry, and governments.  
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On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus (COVID-19) 
outbreak a pandemic. COVID-19 has cost hundreds of thousands of human lives globally, presented 
healthcare professionals with pressing challenges, and exposed the weaknesses of national health 
systems worldwide. Furthermore, it has swiftly caused significant disruption to economies and societies 
on an unprecedented scale (Gibson, 2020). As the evolution and implications of the COVID-19 crisis 
are still unfolding, we posit that exploring the experiences and strategic responses of Asian countries 
may shed some useful light on ways to combat COVID-19 for the rest of the world. We hope that the 
global health system will recover quickly, and that the world economy will be revitalized with the 
contributions and collaboration of science (including social science), industry, and governments 
(Pereira, Temouri, Patnaik, & Mellahi, 2020). 
The management of a global health crisis is a complex affair. It requires individual, organizational, 
and institutional responses and large-scale coordination involving interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary approaches. The Chinese word for ‘crisis’ (危机 wēijī) is particularly effective in 
unpacking its notion; it is made up of the two words Wei (危 = crisis) and Ji (机 = opportunity), 
indicating the positive aspect inherent in perceiving and responding to a crisis. To effectively deal with 
a crisis, we need resilience. To effectively capitalize on the opportunities it presents, we need 
appropriate (and often new) organizational capabilities, innovation, and entrepreneurship. In this paper, 
we first briefly explain the implications of resilience, strategic agility, and entrepreneurship in the 
context of the fight against COVID-19. Then, with a focus on China, South Korea (hereafter Korea), 
and Singapore, we discuss the impact COVID-19 is having on economies and businesses, governmental 
support for businesses and societies, and global supply chain disruptions. To conclude, we discuss two 
trends for the future due to COVID-19: the decoupling from China’s supply chains and the relocation 
of strategic manufacturing operations out of China, and its implications for business and society.    
 
Resilience, strategic agility, and entrepreneurship in combating a global health crisis 
Resilience for and from all 
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When any unprecedented global health challenges and large-scale shocks strike, resilience is in great 
demand. Importantly, it is needed by individuals, organizations, and society to survive and thrive in the 
face of the fight against the virus and the associated economic and societal shocks. In tackling a global 
health crisis, resilience requires not only psychological readiness but also organizational support and 
system-level preparation. Research has shown that occupational contexts can play an important role in 
enabling both individuals and organizations to build resilience and develop effective coping strategies 
(Liu, Cooper, & Tarba, 2019). Healthcare professionals are on the frontline in delivering medical 
treatment to patients under enormous stress; thus, it is critical to prepare those professionals to build 
resilience in their interactions with patients and other stakeholders. Besides, the salience of cultural 
differences should be carefully considered and incorporated in the design of any interventions aimed at 
building resilience in individuals, organizations, and society at large (Liu, 2020). We need to 
collectively ‘bounce back’; as a whole, we will become stronger in the process of combating COVID-
19 and launching ‘new norms’ for our organizations and societies. To echo the inspirational words of 
Winston Churchill, “Success is not final, failure is not fatal; it is the courage to continue that counts”, 
we need the courage, willingness, and ability to build and amplify resilience and rebuild our confidence 
and trust in global health systems. 
 
Strategic agility and organizational capabilities 
Strategic agility is critical for business enterprises and organizations to deal successfully with this grand 
societal challenge. They need to cultivate the capabilities and skills required to swiftly transform their 
business and management practices in dealing with a global health crisis. Large corporations need to 
reinvent themselves and make a swift transition to focus on the creation of value for both business and 
society, and support their agile adaptation to the global value chain changes brought about by the 
disruption of transportation, logistics, and the mobility of people and resources (Kano, Tsang, & Yeung, 
2020). Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can leverage their flexibility and agility in responding to 
market needs and societal demands—such as the production of personal protective equipment (PPE)—
by quickly adjusting their production base (Xing, Liu, Boojihawon, & Tarba, 2020). Furthermore, 
industrial sectors, either manufacturing or services, should respond rapidly by building on the strength 
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of their own particular characteristics. They need to collaborate with governments to maximize the 
effects of the various stimulus packages and crisis rescue schemes. The current crisis may provide 
manufacturing firms with opportunities to transition to the provision of services in response to the 
changes in consumer behaviors, while capitalizing on the dynamics of global export markets (Li, Liu, 
& Bustinza, 2019). It is worth noting that the organizational capabilities associated with strategic agility 
are not simply related to resource readiness and allocation; they require coordination mechanisms to be 
in place to activate and materialize both resources and knowledge bases (Liu & Huang, 2018). For 
instance, the novel concept of Fangcang shelter hospitals entails that Asian countries should possess the 
organizational capabilities suited to build and operate them in response to public health emergencies 
(Chen et al., 2020).  
 
Entrepreneurship and innovation for creative solutions 
In this age of uncertainty linked to the current global health crisis, entrepreneurship can provide creative 
solutions by pooling the knowledge and wisdom of entrepreneurs and innovators across geographical 
boundaries. In particular, to snatch opportunity (Ji) from the jaws of the crisis, entrepreneurs can find 
and create new opportunities across multiple sectors—commercial, social, and governmental—to 
address the grave issues faced by societies worldwide. For instance, hospitals, as hybrid organizations, 
need to accommodate multiple institutional logics in China, while cross-sector collaboration and 
partnerships can promote the process of Chinese healthcare reform (Xing, Liu, & Lattemann, 2018) in 
an inclusive approach that draws upon the beauty and power of entrepreneurship to achieve sustainable 
regional development and economic transformation (Kraus et al., 2020). International organizations 
around the world are in a race against time to find effective solutions to curb the spread of the virus and 
eventually vanquish it. The United Nations is calling for innovative, scientific, and technological 
solutions suited to address the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated impacts. Despite its negative 
impacts, the COVID-19 crisis presents unique opportunities for entrepreneurs to come up with creative 
disruption for the benefit of individuals, organizations, and society. For instance, given the urgent quest 
for indigenous innovation and industry transformation, in China, returnee entrepreneurship is conducive 
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to fostering a mass entrepreneurship and innovation movement (Froese, Sutherland, Lee, Liu, & Pan, 
2019). 
  
Turning crisis into opportunity 
In the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak, Korea was facing a huge crisis. At one point, it was the 
second-largest country in terms of numbers of confirmed cases. This was partly due to its geographic 
proximity to China and partly to a large-scale community infection. However, Korea managed to slow 
down the spread and is making its best efforts to prevent a second wave of infections. While doing so, 
Korea is also proactively driving initiatives aimed at turning this crisis into an opportunity. In the course 
of their fight with the virus, the Korean government and businesses developed a variety of innovative 
prevention measures (e.g., drive-through testing) and products (e.g., testing kits) that can be utilized all 
over the world. Many Korean manufacturers also took the chance to reconsider and restructure their 
global supply chains in order to make them more sustainable. Both the governmental and business 
sectors see clear growth opportunities in non-contact industries, including telecommunication, online 
education, and remote support solutions. Companies can enhance their reputation and contribute to 
alleviating the negative impacts of the global health crisis by implementing corporate social 
responsibility initiatives. Many Korean multinationals, for example, have embarked in providing 
support to securing the supply of medical devices and protecting employees in developing countries 
with weak medical infrastructure. In short, resilience, strategic agility, and entrepreneurship will 
continue to play a key role in capturing value from these opportunities while overcoming the crisis.  
 
Impacts on economies and businesses  
In addition to its awful cost in human lives, the COVID-19 outbreak is creating huge economic 
disruption, especially in the highly connected modern world, in which both trade and foreign 
investments are increasingly globalized and the majority of the population is urbanized. Previous 
research on economic epidemiology has provided useful insights into theoretical models suited to 
analyze potential influenza pandemic events (Geoffard & Philipson, 1996; Gersovitz & Hammer, 2004). 
These studies have examined the links between the epidemiology and dynamics of a disease, the 
6 
 
behavioral responses of people in reaction to a disease outbreak, and the economic consequences of 
both such behavioral responses and the disease (Brahmbhatt & Dutta, 2008). Infectious disease 
outbreaks typically incur both direct and indirect costs. The former refers to the resources required to 
cope with the disease itself, such as expenditures for medical care and treatment. The latter concerns 
the present and future costs levied on society by morbidity and disability; in particular, the losses of 
output caused by reductions in productivity or in the available workforce.  
Over the past few decades, experience with infectious diseases (such as SARS and MERS) has 
revealed that the bulk of the economic costs can actually be ascribed to the preventive behaviors adopted 
by individuals and the transmission control policies enacted by governments, while the costs associated 
with direct medical activities and the actual illness are rather limited (Brahmbhatt & Dutta, 2008). This 
is consistent with what is being observed in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite its impact 
seeming unprecedented in terms of both direct and indirect costs. As the virus spread internationally, 
many countries took action to limit the spread through social isolation or physical distancing policies. 
A number of countries, including the world’s largest economies, have asked most, if not all, of 
businesses to shut down, and have restricted people’s opportunities for aggregation and mobility. Such 
preventive actions have had an immediate and significant impact on both the domestic and international 
economies (Maliszewska, Mattoo, & Van Der Mensbrugghe, 2020). 
The massive lockdowns and distancing measures enacted in various countries immediately scaled 
back both production and consumption. In their efforts to stop the spread of the virus, countries have 
also partially or fully closed their borders, which also hinders the flow of goods, capital, and people. 
This has significantly reduced the international flow of goods and services and simultaneously disrupted 
global supply chains. In the wake of these measures, most countries have already begun to experience 
a macroeconomic hit caused by the pandemic. Less than three months into the COVID-19 crisis 
economists have reached a consensus that the world has been plunged into a global recession (Giles, 
Greeley, & Arnold, 2020). 
It is too early to assess the potential ultimate impact that COVID-19 will have on the global 
economy as well as on those of individual countries. The pandemic is still an ongoing issue and the 
estimates provided by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
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World Bank are being revised every week to reflect real-time information. However, previous 
experience suggests that heterogeneity in national economic structures and trade networks may result 
in each country facing different consequences. For instance, a recent simulation study conducted by the 
World Bank suggests that the gross domestic product (GDP) losses due to the pandemic may be more 
severe in those countries that are the most dependent on trade and/or in which tourism plays a major 
role in the economy (Maliszewska et al., 2020). According to the IMF, while growth in Asia is expected 
to come to a standstill in 2020, there will be substantial downward revisions, ranging from 3.5% in the 
case of Korea, which appears to have managed to slow the spread while minimizing prolonged 
production shutdowns, to over 9% in the case of Thailand and New Zealand, which are being hit by the 
global tourism slowdown, and of Australia, which is being hit by lower revenues in both tourism and 
sales of commodities (Rhee, 2020). 
As shown in Table 1, China, Korea, and Singapore have different characteristics in terms of their 
economic and trade structures, not to mention size and population. Although the economic impacts of 
COVID-19 are expected to be unprecedentedly severe in all three countries, the main challenges faced 
by each may vary considerably depending on the different specificities presented by their respective 
contexts. China is being mostly affected by the fall in industrial production linked to the shutdown of 
factories. As is widely recognized, China has for some time taken on the role of the world’s largest 
workshop and exporter. Accordingly, national factory shutdowns are creating massive knock-on effects 
on the world’s trade and production by disrupting global supply chains. For instance, immediately after 
the Chinese factory shutdowns, electronic component prices increased sharply due to supply shortages; 
this, in turn, has negatively impacted the electronics manufacturing sector across the globe (more details 
in the next section). Moreover, in addition to its importance in the global economy, China spends more 
than 40% of its GDP on investment in fixed capital (i.e., total business spending on fixed assets, such 
as factories, machinery, equipment, property, and inventories of raw materials) which provides the basis 
for future production. This indicates that China’s slowdown due to COVID-19 is likely to have far-
reaching and long-term consequences on the global economy, presenting particular challenges to the 
global value chain. 
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Household spending accounts for almost half of Korea’s GDP, which forms an important part of 
the aggregate demand within the country. As with other countries all over the world, the pandemic is 
hitting household spending hard. The shutdown of businesses and the stern distancing measures 
enforced by the government have directly led to a sharp decrease in employment and household 
spending in most countries. Although Korea has hitherto managed to avoid a complete shutdown, it is 
still facing a sharp contraction in household spending, as many consumers expect their income and 
savings to decrease (Ho, Kim, & Yamakawa, 2020). While such contraction in household spending has 
triggered a localized shock, the potential major threat to the Korean economy has much to do with the 
disruption in international trade and global value chains. Korea is a trade-oriented and export-dependent 
economy, and China is its largest trade partner in terms of both export and import. In particular, Korea 
is the 5th largest export economy in the world, with China accounting for more than 25% of its exports. 
Although it varies across industries, many Korean manufacturers export (technology-intensive) 
intermediate goods to China, where they are then assembled into finished products and shipped to their 
final destinations around the world. While the global pandemic has reduced final destinations demand 
(e.g., from the US and Europe), the huge potential impact of COVID-19 on the Korean economy would 
be linked to the disruption in its exports of value-added intermediate goods to China. 
Singapore would also suffer severely from supply chain disruptions. The country also exports highly 
differentiated intermediate goods to China, and its exporters would find it difficult to redirect their trade 
elsewhere. However, given that Singapore’s added value from gross exports is relatively low, as is the 
country’s share of GDP from its industrial sector, the effects from the manufacturing-supply chain 
disruption may be, to some extent, mitigated. The more critical economic challenge for Singapore may 
be related to its high dependency on its services sector, which accounts for more than 75% of the 
country’s total GDP. Indeed, the pandemic is having its severest effects on aviation, travel, and tourism, 
which account for a substantial portion of the Singaporean economy. This impact is already quite 
evident; in the first quarter of 2020, Singapore's GDP shrank by 10.6%, a sharp pullback from the 0.6% 
growth recorded in the previous quarter (MTI, 2020). The national Ministry of Trade and Industry also 
downgraded Singapore’s forecast GDP growth to between -0.5% and 1.5%. This is the worst GDP 
contraction forecast since the global financial crisis in 2008 and also the first-time the manufacturing, 
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service, and construction sectors are expected to contract since the 1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by its high GDP spending on the exports and imports of goods and services, 
the Singaporean economy cannot be sustained by the country’s domestic workforce alone; it requires 
foreign (non-resident) workers, 300,000 of whom are being isolated and not allowed to work due to 
outbreaks in dormitories and construction sites. This will inevitably have substantial negative effects 
on Singapore’s economy. 
In short, although COVID-19’s actual economic impact will be difficult to assess until the pandemic 
is over, each country will be certainly affected differently, depending on its economic and trade structure. 
Moreover, while much of the impact depends on the spread of the virus and on how governments 
respond, different countries are currently experiencing different stages of the pandemic. China’s 
economy is beginning to spin up, while many others are still maintaining tighter lockdowns. Singapore 
is experiencing a second wave of virus infections due to the large-scale community infection radiating 
from the foreign workers’ dormitories. Korea has managed to slow the spread but still enforces tight 
social distancing measures in order to minimize the likelihood of a second wave of infections. Therefore, 
business managers and policymakers are faced by the need to devise appropriate strategies and policy 
measures to fit different contingencies. At the same time, they need to take into account that the various 
industries, agents, and markets in the global economy are interdependent, and may therefore 
reciprocally exchange knock-on effects, with a time lag across countries.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Government support for business and society 
So far, the pandemic has brought instant disruption to economic activities across the world, as is 
evidenced by the decline in tourism flows, the virtual stoppage of air travel, and a weakening of 
consumer and business confidence. To contain the virus, most countries have imposed lockdowns, 
community quarantines, stay-at-home orders, temporary business closures, and travel restrictions or 
prohibitions. To help allay the financial burden on businesses and support badly affected industries, 
governments and central banks worldwide have enacted a wide range of emergency measures and relief 
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packages. These measures range from employee protection to sizable financial stimulus and tax 
incentives. In an effort to mitigate the economic impacts of COVID-19, the US, the world’s largest 
economy, has passed a US$2 trillion economic stimulus package, the largest in US history. From 
Singapore to Japan, other governments are also deploying billion-dollar rounds of fiscal stimulus to 
minimize the economic pain for both businesses and households. 
As Figure 1 shows, the IMF expects no growth in Asia in 2020. This would be the worst 
performance in almost 60 years, including during the Global and Asian Financial Crises (when 4.7% 
and 1.3% were recorded, respectively). The global and Chinese slowdowns are the two key factors that 
are shaping the outlook for Asia. The global economy is expected to contract by 3% in 2020, while 
Asia’s key trading partners, the US and the EU (European Union), are expected to contract by 6% and 
6.6% respectively. On the other hand, China’s growth is projected to shrink from 6.1% to 1.2% (Rhee, 
2020). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Since the early onset of the pandemic, even before the WHO declared COVID-19 as a global 
pandemic, Asia-Pacific policymakers had already begun to provide fiscal stimulus to bail out the 
aviation industry, which has come to a virtual standstill with the many closed borders and restrictions 
on travel. Global airlines are on the hook for US$35 billion in refunds for unused tickets, worsening a 
cash crunch that is likely to bankrupt some carriers (Lee, 2020). When the crisis that led to lockdown 
in Wuhan and movement controls many areas in China first broke, Korea announced that it would make 
US$240 million worth of low-cost loans available to airlines (MLIT, 2020). While Singapore 
government has pledged US$525 million to support its grounded aviation sector through two schemes—
i.e., a job scheme to subsidize the workers’ monthly wages and an enhanced aviation support package 
aimed at providing relief to the businesses in the sector. China, on the other hand, provides subsidies 
(US$0.0025 per seat kilometer for shared flights and US$0.007 per seat kilometer for solo flights) only 
to those airlines that did not suspend or that have resumed international flights. Air companies that 
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operate important emergency flights will also receive special subsidies to cover their costs (MFPRC, 
2020). 
Since its first confirmed cases in late January/early February, both the Korean and Singaporean 
government have been determined and quickly responded to contain the virus. Subsequently, due to the 
increases in imported cases and local transmission—which, in the case of Korea, spiked to more than 
2,300 cases in just 10 days—more stringent measures, such as enhanced social distancing measures, 
stringent inbound and outbound travel restrictions, school closures, massive testing and contact tracing 
campaigns, self-isolation, and quarantine orders. While Singapore was praised at the beginning for its 
efficient approach to contain the outbreak, it has seen infections spike, with clusters emerging among 
migrant workers, which led to partial lockdown/circuit breaker measures (with only essential services 
remaining unaffected) announced from 6th April to 4th May 2020 (then extended to 1st June 2020) to 
combat the spike in unlinked community transmission. In line with those measures that will further 
strain the economy, both the Korean and Singaporean governments have unveiled urgent stimulus 
packages, summarized in Table 2, to address healthcare costs, household expenditure, unemployment, 
small and medium enterprises, childcare, and so on.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Even as Korea has showcased its success in managing the COVID-19 outbreak without a draconian 
lockdown and while keeping many businesses and factories open, the global economy is sinking into a 
severe recession and Korea’s dependent economy is consequently facing tsunami-like shockwaves (Bae, 
2020). As of April 2020, a total of four stimulus packages totaling US$122.8 billion have been 
announced to boost the domestic market and export industries in order to cushion the blow of the 
employment crisis and liquidity crunch, besides stimulating local consumption by maximizing 
advanced payments to inject liquidity. To boost domestic spending, the government is also making 
advanced payments for those public investment projects that were slated for the second half of the 2020. 
In addition, the government aims to create about 500,000 new jobs in the public sector. To fund the 
extra budget, an additional US$8.5 billion in treasury bonds will be issued this year.  
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Within a span of two months (February to April 2020), Singapore has announced three economic 
stimulus packages amounting to S$59.9 billion (US$42.8 billion), which constitutes 12% of the 
country’s GDP, and encompasses the unity, resilience, and solidarity budgets (Sim, 2020). In addition, 
the government has also provided grants to the food sector to provide delivery services and invest 
research and development capabilities to develop test kits and ensure food security. The government 
has also introduced a COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act to offer temporary relief to those 
businesses and individuals who are unable to fulfill their contractual obligations due to the virus. The 
provisions in this Act have also come into effect on 20 April 2020. This Act relates to temporary 
exemption from legal action for inability to fulfill certain contracts as well as increased thresholds for 
bankruptcy and insolvency for financially distressed individuals and businesses. Ever since the massive 
outbreak in the foreign workers' dormitories, the government has also deployed support teams to address 
the workers’ essential needs by setting up medical facilities and triage clinics, bringing in supplies and 
food, as well as managing logistics and housekeeping. All construction and infrastructure projects have 
also been placed on hiatus to prevent further transmission of the virus, while ensuring continued wages 
for all foreign workers. 
To stop the spread of the virus, the Chinese government has enacted aggressive measurements such 
as the lockdown of the heaviest affected regions (including Wuhan), suspensions of public gatherings, 
the mass isolation of infected patients, prohibitions on travel, and home-quarantines. These 
measurements have taken a toll on China’s domestic economy that could impact international trade and 
global production networks and value chains, and that could trigger global turbulence and a catastrophe 
in the financial markets. As summarized in Table 3, China’s package of policies can be largely grouped 
in during- and post-outbreak ones. During the outbreak period, the government’s economic policies 
were primarily aimed at supporting antivirus manufacturing, transportation, services, and retail sectors. 
Conversely, for the post-outbreak period, they are more focused on supporting the resumption of work 
and production and on boosting domestic spending. 
 




As part of its focus on restarting the economy after the pandemic, the central government has also 
required local governments to simplify business approvals and optimize services. To expand domestic 
demand, several ministries are also seeking to stimulate infrastructure investment in a number of 
projects related to the energy, transportation, and information technology (5G) industries. To stabilize 
international trade and foreign investment, the central government has ensured the full and timely 
payment of export tax rebates, with the exception of energy-intensive, polluting, or resource-heavy 
products, financial institutions are being encouraged to increase foreign trade credits, defer loan 
payments, and extend debt rollovers for small trading firms. To mitigate the adverse impact of the 
pandemic as per the rolled out measurements, an additional central bank credit line of ¥1 trillion (about 
US$140 billion) will be extended and fund will also be raised through issuance of an additional ¥1.85 
trillion (US$ 259 billion) of local government bonds. 
As the global containment measures are severely affecting economies, there is a need for targeted 
support to the hardest-hit households and sectors to protect jobs and industries. Asian economies—like 
Korea, Singapore, and China—have taken several initiatives in this direction, especially to ease the 
financial stress of the aviation and tourism industries, and SMEs. Among the three countries, 
Singapore’s stimulus packages are the most comprehensive. Bracing for a recession, the government 
will draw S$21 billion (US$15 billion) from its national reserves to sustain the economy which will be 
further strained by the circuit breaker measurements. Korea, in comparison to other countries, was able 
to avoid a complete lockdown and minimize the impact, its stimulus package is more focused on directly 
affected sectors and individuals under isolation. Further injections of funds into the economy are aimed 
at helping with unemployment and boost domestic spending. So far, China has not unveiled a targeted 
economic plan, but has opted to inject funding into banks and local government in the hope that it will 
trickle down to small businesses and residents. China is stepping up stimulus efforts to help growth, but 
is largely relying on providing money to local governments to speed up infrastructure investment, rather 
than of distributing direct handouts to households or conducting broad-based tax cuts for businesses 
and individuals, like Korea and Singapore are doing (Tang, 2020). To ensure that these various stimulus 
packages produce the best outcome, governments must avoid incurring in ‘policy fatigue’, whereby 
fiscal measures do not work as expected. Governments must recognize the limited effectiveness of 
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stimulus packages. Stimulus packages can only help to cope with short-term challenges and strengthen 
economic and social resilience. They would not address the structural issues that are affecting job 
security during recession as fiscal and monetary policies alone cannot re-establish broken supply chains, 
bring people back to shopping malls, or reboot air-travel. The main thrust should be directed to restoring 
public confidence by effectively containing the virus, making it possible to safely put an end to 
lockdowns and movement restrictions. Even when restrictions are lifted and governments undertake 
more infrastructure projects to help businesses, it will take time to draw up the necessary contracts and 
to get the required approvals before any funding can be channeled to the businesses involved. 
Government should be mindful to streamline processes and cut down red-tapes to facilitate resumption 
of work within a shorter time-frame. 
 
Global supply chains and business collaboration 
The disruption in global supply chains is a major issue associated with the economic costs of COVID-
19 pandemic. In particular, it has much to do with the breakout having its epicenter in China, which has 
been functioning as the world's manufacturing hub in various sectors. Over the past few decades, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have increasingly fragmented their production networks to take 
advantage of locational advantages and a global production scale. Advances in information and 
communications technology (ICT) and international transport networks have allowed MNEs to more 
easily fine-slice their value chain activities, optimize and coordinate the location of specific sets of 
activities across borders, and de-internalize those business activities that were considered less critical 
(Dicken, 2011; Rugman, Verbeke, & Yuan, 2011). Accordingly, to achieve systemic efficiency and 
productivity across entire international production systems, MNEs have relocated their value chain 
activities to optimal locations. Their production processes have been increasingly interconnected across 
the vertical trading chain that stretches across many countries, with each country specializing in 
particular stages of a good’s production sequence (Hummels, Ishii, & Yi, 2001). Since it opened up to 
the world in 1978—and relying on its abundant, cheap, and well-disciplined workforce—China has 
become the world's workshop. Over the past few decades, China has developed its business ecosystem 
to establish industrial production systems that require networks of suppliers, component manufacturers, 
15 
 
distributors, governments, and customers. By moving their low-end production to China, many MNEs 
from all over the world have attained cost advantages (Buckley, 2009).  
 
Impact on the electronics industry 
In 2019, China accounted for over 50% of global semiconductor consumption (Deloitte 2020). To limit 
the spread of the virus, critical electronics manufacturing hubs have also been temporarily shut down, 
which has adversely affected the global supply chain, impacting both suppliers (through shortages of 
materials, components, and finished goods) and consumers (due to reduced spending on semiconductor-
dependent products such as consumer electronics and automobiles). Although the full impact on the 
global economy is still unknown, the fallout across the electronics value chain (from materials to final 
products) will likely be critical because intermediate products, many of which are produced in China, 
are deeply integrated in the global technology supply chain, as shown in Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The areas most affected by the disruption in China’s electronics supply chain are also those in which 
the largest electronics firms are located, ranging from the coastal Guangdong province to the inner 
Henan province. Although some firms have gradually started to resume production, the reality is that 
electronics firms based in China are not operating at full capacity, but only between 30% and 50%. This 
is creating a knock-on effect on global supply chains (especially those dealing with low- to mid-end 
parts and components). Hubei also plays a significant role in the global supply chain of critical 
electronics components. The province is the production base of Taiwan’s PCB factories, including 
Taiwan Optoelectronics, Xinxing, Jianding, Nanzi Electric, and Dingying. In Asia, both Korea and 
Taiwan rely mostly on China for the downstream assembly of finished electronics products. As much 
as 70% of the two countries’ exports of intermediate goods in the electronics sector are destined for the 
Chinese market. On the other hand, other less technologically sophisticated Asian countries rely heavily 
on China for their upstream supply of electronics parts and components. India, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam source 40-60% of their intermediate goods imports in the electronics sector from Chinese 
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suppliers. The global pandemic has exposed the potential risks to and vulnerability of the electronics 
and semiconductor industry, challenging it to refashion its global supply chain model (Figure 2). 
Specifically, businesses need to focus on how to minimize supply chain disruptions and to adjust rapidly 
to a changing landscape by first understanding their risk exposure arising from the origin of supply and 
the impact on demand to plan supply. Secondly, businesses need to anticipate supply shortages due to 
unforeseen disruptions in the supply chain (e.g., lockdowns and closing of air or railways) in order to 
consider other modes of transportation. They will also need to pre-book their freight arrangements to 
avoid over-congestion of traffic and routes when the restrictions are lifted. Finally, to avoid ‘putting all 
eggs in one basket”’, they may consider including more suppliers and sourcing for suppliers from non-
China countries. The pandemic has caused some countries to pull their firm’s manufacturing activities 
out of China—e.g., Japan has earmarked US$2.2 billion of its record economic stimulus package to 
helping its manufacturers relocate their Chinese production operations (Bloomberg 2020). Pegatron, a 
Taiwanese key assembler of iPhones with manufacturing sites in China, is also adding production 
capacity back home in Taiwan. This signals a potential shift in the global production paradigm that has 
governed the electronics industry for well over three decades. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Although this outward-bound trend is accelerating, it is unlikely that China will give up its place as 
the world's electronics workshop. This is because of the difficulties involved in replicating the intricate 
network of suppliers, competent workers, efficient distribution systems, and large market offered by the 
country. Any large-scale relocation of manufacturing capabilities would also take time.  
 
Impact on the automobile industry 
The disruption affecting global value chains has impacted many Korean manufacturers, particularly 
those that rely heavily on vertical supply chains located in China. The Hyundai Motor Company, for 
instance, had to put its production line in Korea on hold not because of the government’s shutdown 
order, but due to the shortage of an essential auto part—a wiring harness—that is procured from China. 
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A wiring harness is an assembly of electrical cables or wires that transmit electrical signals or power. 
Hyundai procures it from three Korean suppliers, all of which have their production lines in China. As 
this particular wiring harness is quite large, it is not efficient to stockpile it in large quantities. Therefore, 
Hyundai usually only stores stock for a week's production and, due to its close geographic proximity to 
China, relies heavily on just-in-time delivery logistics. Accordingly, the supply chain disruption 
affected the Korean automaker more and much faster than others (Kim, 2020). The shutdown of the 
production line of Korea’s largest automaker is having significant knock-on effects on the national and 
regional economies, as all other suppliers and related businesses have also had to stop their production.  
 
Impact on food security 
The pandemic has exposed the fragility of our globalized economy and the tangled complexity of our 
global supply chains. As an import-driven economy, Singapore is particularly vulnerable to such an 
unprecedented disruption to international networks, which represents a “good lesson for everyone to 
look at the supply chain resilience” (Chan 20201). A major concern for Singapore is food supply, as 90% 
of food products are imported from 170 countries. To ensure that trade lines are kept open for food and 
essential items, minimizing disruption and speeding up recovery, a Ministerial Coordination Group on 
COVID-19 (MCGC)—which was convened by Canada and included the foreign ministers of Brazil, 
France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Singapore, Korea, Turkey, and the UK—
has committed to maintaining global links, such as transport and supply chain connections and to lower 
tariffs. This signifies global cooperation through close bilateral and multilateral communication and 
collaboration to mitigate disruption and respond to the development of COVID-19.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In brief, COVID-19 has accelerated two powerful trends for the future: the decoupling from China’s 
supply chains and the relocation of strategic manufacturing operations out of China. Moving forward, 
there will be an increased need for infrastructure and technical means suited to ensure transparency 
 
1 Interview with Mr. Chan Chun Sing, Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, 4th February 2020, Squawk 
Box Asia, CNBC 
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within global supply chains. There must also be a call for the development of predictive models that 
take into consideration uncertainties and risk factors in the proactive scheduling and dynamic planning 
of supply. These predictive models will help corporate decision-makers to undertake what-if analyses 
of various scenarios and to consider whether to integrate automation and artificial intelligence (AI) to 
increase efficiency. Moving forward, greater collaboration between governments and industries will be 
needed to ensure minimum disruption in global supply chains (Lim and Lee, 2020).We hope that this 
paper will trigger intellectually stimulating debates and meaningful actions from individuals, 
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Table 1. A comparison of economic and trade structures 
 China Korea Singapore 
Land size (km2) 9,326,410 96,920 709.2 
Population (2020 est.) 1,394,015,977 51,835,110 6,209,660 
GDP (by sector of origin) 
  Agriculture 7.9% 2.2% 0.0% 
  Industry 40.5% 39.3% 24.8% 
  Services 51.6% 58.3% 75.2% 
GDP (by end use) 
  Household consumption 39.1% 48.1% 35.6% 
  Government consumption 14.5% 15.3% 10.9% 
  Investment in fixed capital 42.7% 31.1% 24.8% 
  Investment in inventories 1.7% 0.0% 2.8% 
  Exports of goods and services        20.4% 43.1% 173.3% 
  Imports of goods and services       -18.4% -37.7% -149.1% 
Workforce (by occupation) 
  Agriculture 27.7% 4.8% 0.7% 
  Industry 28.8% 24.6% 25.6% 
  Services 43.5% 70.6% 73.7% 
Export (Billion US$) 2216 577 397 
  Top export partner US (19.2%) China (25.1%) China (14.7%) 
 Hong Kong (12.2%) US (12.2%) Hong Kong (12.6%) 
 Japan (5.9%) Vietnam (8.2%) Malaysia (10.8%) 
 Korea (4.4%) HK (6.9%) US (6.6%) 
Import (Billion US$) 1740 458 312 
  Top import partner Korea (9.7%) China (20.5%) China (13.9%) 
 Japan (8.6%) Japan (11.5%) Malaysia (12.0%) 
 US (7.3%) US (10.5%) US (10.7%) 
 Germany (5.0%) Germany (4.2%) Japan (6.3%) 
Note: GDP and trade Data (2017 est.) sourced from CIA, the World Factbook; Agriculture includes 
farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, energy production, and 
construction. Services covers government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and all 




Table 2: Urgent stimulus packages from the Korean and Singaporean governments  
Categories Korea Singapore 
Family/ 
Household 
- Childcare subsidies 
- Cash support for lower income 
households  
- Care and Support Package in cash and 
utilities rebates for household 
expenses 
- Temporary Relief Fund and COVID-
19 Support Grant for job loss 




- Income subsidies for persons in 
isolation 
- Financial aid package for the self-
employed 
- Self-employed relief scheme 
- Income subsidies for the self-
employed in isolation 
- Traineeships for new graduates 
Businesses/ 
Enterprises 
- Business Continuity and Support 
Package for businesses and workers 
- Financial aid package for small firms 
and microbusiness owners  
- Low-rate loans for start-ups and 
venture companies 
- Job-retraining Support 
- Extended maturity of trade insurance 
- Emergency liquidity to help local 
companies to expand overseas 
business 
- Stabilization and Support Package for 
businesses and workers 
- Job-retraining Support 
- Loan for SMEs 
- Enhanced trade loans 
Sectorial - Increase in budget for healthcare 
sector 
- Increase in Public Sector 
employment 
- Increase in budget for healthcare 
sector 
- Support for Hotel and Tourism sector 
Fees/ Loans - Suspension of or exemption from 
various government fees and charges 
related to research and development 
activities and usage of government 
facilities 
- Freeze of all government fees and 
charges from 1 April 2020 to 31 
March 2021 
- Suspension of all student loan 
payments and interest charges from 1 
June 2020 to 31 May 2021 
- Suspension of all late payment 
charges on public housing mortgage 
arrears for three months 
Tax/ 
Incentives 
- Value-added tax exemptions 
- Reduction of business property taxes 
- Tax cut for the self-employed 
- Deferment of income tax payments 
for companies and self-employed 
persons 
- Property tax rebates for commercial 
properties 
- Rental waivers for commercial 
properties 
- Legal relief for breaches of contract 
- Foreign Workers Levy waiver 
Total Amount US$ 122.8 billion USS$42.8 billion 





Table 3: China’s economic policies during and after the COVID-19 outbreak 
Supporting Party During the Outbreak Period After the Outbreak Period 
Central 
Government 
- Tax deductions and fee-waivers for 
enterprises and taxpayers in medical 
services, public transportation and 
delivery of daily essentials as well as 
the transportation, catering, 
accommodation and tourism sectors. 
- Subsidies for producers of anti-virus-
related products and startups 
- Exemption of VAT for small 
businesses 
- Exemption or halving of Social 
insurance contributions by 
employees 
- Lowering of electricity tariffs 
- Reopening of the stock market 
Local 
Government 
- Reduction and deferment of rental 
payments 
- Refund of social insurance payments 
- Subsidies for on-the-job training 
- Allowances for deferred 
payments of social security 
premiums and certain taxes, rent 
reductions, loan extensions, loan 




- The People’s Bank of China’s 
(Central Bank) easing of market credit 
through open market operations, 
reserve requirement ratios, loan 
facilities, refinancing and rediscount 
policies 
- Provision of low loan rate and 
additional credit facility to antivirus-
related manufacturers and producers 
of critical medical products 
- Reduction of interest rates, 
increasing debt rollovers and 
renewal loans and specific credit 
lines for resumption of 
production for SMEs 
- People’s Bank of China 
(central bank) cutting its 
targeted reserve 
requirement ratio by 0.5% 
(to 1%) to release ¥550 
billion (US$77 billion) of 
long-term funds 




Table 4. The most impacted sectors and their integration in the global supply chain 
 
Chinese share of 
global exports 
Chinese share of 
gross output 
Computer, electronics, optical products 30% 49% 
Electrical equipment 28% 59% 
Other machinery and equipment 28% 47% 
Automobiles 5% 33% 




Figure 1. Growth in Asia in 1963-2021 (Source: adapted from IMF, Rhee 2020)
 
 
Figure 2: Steps to be taken to improve supply chains during the Coronavirus outbreak 
Understand exposure Anticipate shortages Source for alternative options 
• Identify origin of supply to 
identify severity of risk 
• Enhance communication to 
employees on infection risk 
concerns 
• Determine impacted 
demand to determine 
required supply 
 
• Determine available 
inventory and consider 
transport alternatives 
• Pre-book air freight/rail 
capacity and try to avoid 
congested routes 
 
• Consider alternatives; i.e., 
move to non-Chinese 
countries if multi-sourced; 
Automation/deploy AI; or 
develop new supplies 
 
 
Note: Adapted from McKinsey (2020)  
